..of all the differences between man and the lower animals,
the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important...
It is the most noble of all the attributes of man, leading him
without a moment's hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow
creature; of after due deliberation, impelled simply be the
deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause
—Charles Darwin, in the Descent of Man
§
It has been fashionable for modern "social Darwinists" to claim that support for their economic, political, and personal philosophies come directly from Charles Darwin's theories of evolution, adaptation, and natural selection. Even their hero, Herbert Spencer, says that if Darwin read his ideas he would agree that the natural extension of his theory includes the inevitable notion of "survival of the fittest". This notion leaves little room for such sentimental ideas as "morality", and clearly allows justification for any number of misdeeds against our fellow man. For Poor Darwin, it is said, simply had a momentary lapse of his rational faculties and thus failed to take his theory of evolution to its logical conclusions.
Few social Darwinists take notice, however, that Darwin himself wrote precisely on this very topic, postulating views which are in direct contradiction to the social Darwinist ideals. While Darwin did not directly refer to the unsavoury notion of survival of the fittest, he did talk extensively about morality after finding that it occurs with more frequency than many of us would like to admit today. Darwin observed that two (even unrelated) men are actually quite able and willing to be altruistic towards one another. It seems that human beings, unlike the "lower" animals, have evolved the strong capacity to will themselves into behaving morally. They can counteract their selfish, individual instincts by relying on their social ones.
How is this possible if selfish, individual selection is the primary mechanism of evolutionary change? Because it is not the only mechanism. As Darwin noted, sexual selection, learnt change through culture, and spontaneous inherited change are other ways by which humans change. So too is the important mechanism of group selection.
The idea of group level selection parallels that of individual level selection. Darwin found that members of the same groups are often highly altruistic, not hesitating to risk their own lives for the safety and survival of their comrades. He explained this observation by claiming it as a part of the selection process—selection at a higher level. Groups (e.g., tribes, neighbourhoods, communities, perhaps even cities and countries) whose members are altruistic towards one another (and the opposite towards other groups) are more likely to survive than groups whose members are fiercely competitive and aggressive.
Some biologists do not take this as evidence for true altruism, arguing that group co-operation is simply a front for more selfish individual motives; the individual who gets along well with his group will gain more support and resources for ensuring ensure the birth, rearing, and survival of his own offspring. Darwin actually did not believe this, claiming that group selection rarely provides one individual within a co-operating group more benefit than another. Actually, there is often no net benefit for the individuals; only for the group. In the groups Darwin observed, the prevalence of fierce selfishness within groups was absent because the social instincts of all the members managed to "rub off" on those individuals whose selfish motives might otherwise have primary power.
Whether or not this view of humans is useful for psychology depends, to some extent, on what we believe are the reasons (origins, benefits) for group selection. Of what value is it? Consideration of these reasons will determine how we approach our clients and their lives. It will also help us understand how people's fundamental assumptions influence the attitudes they develop towards one another. The more acquainted we become with the dogmatic nature of some of these assumptions, the better we are able to challenge prejudicial attitudes and promote greater tolerance.
We can interpret group selection and morality in a selfish light, claiming that in the end it serves only individuals. This kind of reasoning—which is quite popular today—derives directly from social Darwinist interpretations of the theory of evolution. Such interpretations justify fierce, unfettered individual competition and cruel behaviour, claiming that it is all for the betterment of the human species. Yet such interpretations are suspect because they are based on reason, an epistemological assumption that (at least in this case) appears to have most value for one small—but powerful—segment of society: the modern business world. That world values logic and reason, and reason is intimately tied to evolutionary thought. Only rational explanations for behaviours are acceptable. When we try to explain something "rationally"—especially when we try to explain the causes and reasons for a particular behaviour (note that "reasons" derives from the word "reason", which in turn derives from "rationality"), we are expected to explain the ultimate utility of something. Such and such a human behaviour happens because, in the end, it benefits something or someone. Group selection, modern rationalists will claim, occurs for individual, selfish reasons. But this was not convincing for Darwin. And it is not convincing for me, either, because the criteria for what is a "reasonable" explanation (i.e., for what "utility" is) is socially constructed.
Indeed, Darwin had his own "rational" interpretation of group selection. As he wrote in The Descent of Man, group selection is a secondary mechanism of evolutionary change superimposed on the first (individual selection), allowing for the "greatest number of individuals [to be] reared in full vigour and health, with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are exposed". But such an explanation is often considered unreasonable by the social Darwinists because it would make no "rational" sense that an evolutionary mechanism exists which, in the end, does not seem (in their mind) to benefit anyone. "Weaker" humans are given a chance to grow fully and survive, but how, they ask, is being an "inferior" human "of benefit" to them or to society at large? Of course, that group selection is of "utility" because it allows another human simply to be alive is not considered. Again, we see that the "rational" explanation is intertwined with some dogmatic assumptions about the notion of utility. This was not necessarily the case centuries earlier, in which what was considered a "reasonable" explanation for various aspects of life was much different. Just as people today consider selfish individual interest as a "reasonable" explanation for group selection, people during the time of St. Augustine considered it perfectly "reasonable" that God controlled the world in whatever way he saw fit. In the end, what the true reason for group selection is may be beyond our current rational faculties. So where does this leave us as psychologists?
If Spencerian ideas are unpalatable (particularly because they are socially constructed for the benefit of the rich and powerful) and group altruism is still a prominent reality, then we can (unless "proven" otherwise) be confident that true, unselfish altruism is possible between people and ought to be promoted even more. Whether in the therapist's offices or the classroom or the home, we can be confident that we are not deluding other people when we encourage them to look inside themselves and find it within their hearts to care for other people. We can bolster our admonitions by convincingly arguing for natural place of altruism. On a larger level, this has particular implications for the kind of interpersonal relations psychologists are being called upon to promote in what is called the new "global village". It also has implications for the extent to we think some of our more hard-nosed clients are beyond change. You see, Social Darwinists and neo-Liberals continue to co-opt Darwin's ideas for purposes of their own greed, but how long can they continue to do so when it is apparent that Darwin supported the increasing reality of true altruism?
If neo-Liberals want to create a "global community" then the natural outgrowth of that might actually be not increased profits but a new global community of people who feel equally raped and pillaged that they will band together, consider themselves as one large in-group, and then rebel against the out-group—the few selfish and rich powerbrokers. If in this sense Darwinian selection, in the end, can no longer be used as a justification for immoral behaviours, then one of two things must happen. Those who espouse it must either find a new philosophy to co-opt (and mere "philosophy" it will be) or accept Darwin's ideas as he actually meant them. If they do the former, they will inevitably find new, dubious justifications for their behaviour (and the rest of us will have an accurate way of explaining, and, hopefully, moderating their behaviour). If they do the latter, the result may be a serious evaluation of their true motives—and perhaps the realisation that the effects of their own Social Darwinism will be a group selection process that may ultimately silence them and fold them into a more altruistic in-group of have-nots.
Copyright © 2002, by Eddy M. Elmer
Permanent URL: http://www.eddyelmer.com/articles/evosfu.htm